remainder of this review to that question, and to the value of the new evidence offered in Kiparsky's book. At numerous places Kiparsky indicates that in his opinion Påˆini lived after the completion of Vedic literature. I shall argue that this point of view may have to be somewhat modified.
(2)
Regarding the rules of the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ Kiparsky rightly remarks that "we cannot use them as information on Påˆini's sandhi usage, since nothing guarantees the authenticity of the present text in that regard " (p. 19) . In a footnote on the same page he specifies that "there are some facts which virtually guarantee its inauthenticity: there are obligatory sandhi rules which are never observed in the text: 8.3.32 ∫amo hrasvåd aci ∫amuˆ nityam requires a copy of a final ∫, ˆ or n after a short vowel to be obligatorily (nityam) added before a following vowel, e.g. kurvan åste > kurvan nåste. Accordingly, 6.1.77 should not read iko yaˆ aci, but iko yaˆ ˆaci, and so on." Consequently Påˆini's sandhi rules, and the occurrence of vå, vibhå∑å and anyatarasyåm therein, cannot be tested against the text of the A∑ †ådhyåy¥.
With regard to sandhi in Classical Sanskrit Kiparsky is equally careful: "the external sandhi of Classical Sanskrit manuscripts obviously has no claim to represent the author's original text, but has been modified freely by the copyists" (p. 79).
But in comparing Påˆini with the Vedic language, five out of Kiparsky's nineteen cases deal with sandhi, or better, with orthoepy in one form or another; they are cases 6, 12, 17, 18, 19 . Is the manuscript tradition here enough reliable to warrant this?
We have in the Pråtißåkhyas evidence that much of Vedic literature has indeed been preserved in a remarkably reliable fashion since the time those Pråtißåkhyas were written. Most detailed information is obtained from the Ùgveda-Pråtißåkhya, which shows that the Ùgveda in that time differed but little from its present form, even in details of orthoepy. 2 However, the fixed form which the Vedic Saµhitås have obtained in the times of their respective Pråtißåkhyas is the outcome of a long process, during which their form, at least as regards details of sandhi etc., was not fixed. Elsewhere (Bronkhorst, 1981b) I have studied this process in as far as it concerns the Ùgveda in some detail. The most interesting conclusion (in the present context) which I could reach there is that Påˆini stands somewhere in the middle of this process, in a time when the orthoepy of the Ùgveda had not yet been settled upon. There can be no doubt that in Påˆini's time also the other Vedic Saµhitås had not yet reached their present shape where these details are concerned.
But this means that strictly speaking we cannot test Kiparsky's hypothesis by comparing Påˆini's sandhi rules and the sandhi actually used in the Vedic Saµhitås as we have them. 3 It is rather the other way round: We need Påˆini's rules, together [275] with a correct understanding of vå, vibhå∑å and anyatarasyåm, in order to find out what orthoepy Påˆini considered correct for the Vedic Saµhitås. 4 This brings us to an important point. Påˆini's rules on Vedic sandhi do not necessarily describe the sandhi which was actually used in the Vedic texts which Påˆini had before him. Rather, they describe the sandhi as it ought to be according to Påˆini. This is confirmed by the circumstance that Påˆini sometimes gives the opinions of others besides his own, e.g., in P. 8.3.17-19. In the context of Vedic sandhi we therefore prefer not to follow Kiparsky's suggestion (p. 4) to translate vå 'often' and vibhå∑å 'rarely'. We must here prefer the translations vå 'preferably' and vibhå∑å 'marginally, preferably not'.
The question presents itself if perhaps also the other Vedic rules tell us what Påˆini thought ought to be, rather than what he found to be the case in Vedic literature. This question may, at first sight, look absurd, since Vedic literature is usually considered prePåˆinian, and fixed but for such rather minor details as sandhi etc. But is this correct? It is at least conceivable that part of Vedic literature -say some of the Bråhmaˆas, Óraˆyakas and Upani∑ads 5 -were still to be written, or were being written, in Påˆini's time. In this case indications in the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ like chandasi 'in sacred literature' would not exclusively refer to the language of works which had been composed long before Påˆini, but also to the language that should be used when works of a certain kind were still to be composed. In other words, the rules on Vedic would then not only describe the language laid down in the scriptures, but also prescribe the correct forms to be used when composing more such scriptures.
There is a priori nothing against this possibility. I have elsewhere (Bronkhorst, 1981a) argued at length that it is not correct to ascribe an awareness of linguistic development to the ancient Indian grammarians. In particular Vedic and classical Sanskrit were not looked upon as precursor resp. successor in time. 6 This implies that Vedic was looked upon as the language proper for a certain kind of literature, even if that literature was still being, or to be, composed. In this connection it is important to recall that "the language of the sacred texts ... was not only known from old manuscripts, but, as we are apt to forget, was actually used during the sacrificial rites (yajñakarmaˆi, in Påˆ. 1.2.34) and in the daily recitations (anvadhyåyam, in Nir. 1.4 opposed to bhå∑åyåm)" (Thieme, 1935: 67) .
I shall now briefly survey some of the arguments which have been brought forward to show that Påˆini postdates Vedic literature, or certain parts of it: Liebich (1891: 22-37) took one thousand finite verbs from each (i) Aitareya Bråhmaˆa, (ii) B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad, (iii) Óßvalåyana and Påraskara G®hyasËtra, (iv) Bhagavadg¥tå. These verb forms he compared with Påˆini's grammar, in order to find out which of these texts came closest to the language described in the [276] A∑ †ådhyåy¥. This led him to the conclusion that both the G®hyasËtras are closest to Påˆini, that the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa and B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad preceded him, and that the Bhagavadg¥tå came later.
Interestingly, Liebich's conclusions depend upon the assumption that forms accounted for by Vedic rules cannot be considered as belonging to Påˆini's time. If we reject this assumption, the results of Liebich's own investigation lead to conclusions quite different from his. In that case, the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa retains 9 (out of 1000) forms which cannot be accounted for by Påˆini's grammar, the B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad 31, the two G®hyasËtras 42, the Bhagavadg¥tå 37 (Liebich, 1891: 34) . And if we follow Liebich in excluding certain other forms from consideration (for various reasons), these numbers become respectively 6, 27, 41, 37. In plain language this means that now the language of the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa is closest to Påˆini.
Earlier Liebich (1886a; 1886b) had brought to light the far-reaching agreement between the use of cases in the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa and Påˆini. Here too Liebich (1886b: 278, 309) argues for an early date of the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa from the fact that some constructions in it are expressly designated as Vedic in the A∑ †ådhyåy¥, an argument which is invalid once we assume that Vedic was still in use in Påˆini's time. Note that 'prePåˆinian' anu in a temporal sense (Liebich, 1886b: 281) recurs in (post-Påˆinian) Påli (Franke, 1890: 80) . The close agreement between the use of the aorist in the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa and the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ has been pointed out by Bhandarkar (1868: 416-19; 1885: 160-61) . Keith (1920: 42-44) argues for a date of the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa long before Påˆini, on a number of grounds. The most interesting one is, no doubt, that the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa (iii.12), by ascribing too high a number of syllables to a phrase, appears to date from before the orthoepic diaskeuasis of the Ùgveda. The same is true of the Aitareya Óraˆyaka (i.3.4). Keith concludes from this that the Aitareya precedes Íåkalya, who in his turn precedes Påˆini. That this conclusion is unwarranted, since the orthoepic diaskeuasis of the Ùgveda had not come to a close until long after Íåkalya and Påˆini, has been sufficiently demonstrated elsewhere (Bronkhorst, 1981b) . The argument based on the language of the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa which is older than Påˆini's bhå∑å is of course invalid in the present context. That Yåska knew the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa is not here of interest, for the question of Yåska's date vis-à-vis Påˆini remains open (cf. Cardona, 1976: 270-73) . The only argument that remains is that Påˆini may refer to this Bråhmaˆa in P. 5.1.62 as "the Bråhmaˆa with forty Adhyåyas" (cf. Weber, 1876: 48) . But this argument by itself cannot of course carry much weight. Wecker's (1906) investigation purporting to show that the Chåndogya Upani∑ad and the B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad are older than Påˆini is of poor quality. His arguments are circular: whenever he finds a deviation from Påˆini in these [277] Upani∑ads, the conclusion is drawn that the deviations concerned are pre-Påˆinian! This even happens where the evidence suggests another conclusion, as in the following statement (Wecker, 1906: 18) If we agree with Keith (1920: 46) that the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa is one of the oldest of the Bråhmaˆas, we can sum up the preceding section by saying that none of the evidence adduced by the research surveyed conflicts even with the rather extreme assumption that Påˆini is close in time to the older surviving Bråhmaˆas, provided that we can believe that indeed Vedic was a language known and for certain purposes still actively used in Påˆini's time. Can we believe this?
Some support for this belief can be derived from P. 4.3.105, which speaks of "Bråhmaˆa and Kalpa works uttered by ancient [sages]" (puråˆaprokte∑u bråhmaˆakalpe∑u), thus implying that there also were Bråhmaˆa and Kalpa works uttered by not so ancient sages. 7 But for a more interesting and convincing case we return to Kiparsky's book. P. 6.1.209-210 deal with a special accent, which applies preferably not (vibhå∑å) in sacred literature (chandasi) (209), and obligatorily (nityam) in mantra (210). Kiparsky rightly observes that since "[m]antra refers to the metrical portion of Vedic literature, ... this limits the scope of the more general term chandas to the remainder, i.e. Vedic prose" (p. 69). He then draws an inference: "There is no way around the conclusion that Påˆini knew a sizeable portion of accented prose -which today survives only in unaccented form and perhaps has been in part lost altogether" (p. 69; K.'s italics). The inference seems sound, but there is a difficulty.
I do not for a moment doubt that writing was known, and used, already before Påˆini (see Bronkhorst, 1982b) . But to assume that accents were indicated before, or contemporaneously with, Påˆini, seems unacceptable. There are two reasons for this, both discussed by Thieme (1935: 120-30 ). The first is that Påˆini's grammar itself was only known in unaccented form to Patañjali and before him, even though accents play a crucial role in his grammar. 8 The second is that "a [278] variety of accenting systems [are] in existence, which change from Saµhitå to Saµhitå; this suggests "that written accents are an invention of a comparatively young age, that they did not belong to the stock of the alphabet" (Thieme, 1935: 129-30) .
How then did Påˆini know the Vedic accents, especially where they deviated from the accents of his bhå∑å? In the case of mantras we may assume that he would ask Brahmins who could recite the mantra concerned, if he was not himself one of them. But Vedic prose, i.e. Bråhmaˆas etc., was never memorized the way the Vedic Saµhitås were, and are. We must accept that Påˆini could make pronouncements on the accents of Vedic prose on the basis of his acquaintance with its language, just the way he could make pronouncements about the accents of his bhå∑å.
In this connection we should recall that the whole of the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ purports to describe the Vedic language (as well as the bhå∑å), except for the few places where this is explicitly denied. This becomes particularly clear in P. 6.1.180-181. Rule 180 prescribes a certain accent, and rule 181 adds: vibhå∑å bhå∑åyåm "preferably not in the bhå∑å". P. 6.1.180 must of necessity be about Vedic (so Kiparsky, p. 129), even though there is no indication whatever to that effect. The same is true of P. 8.2.97, for the same reason. (5) It is time to see in how far the evidence contained in Kiparsky's book and pertaining to Påˆini's date allows us to say anything more definite about the position of Påˆini relative to Vedic literature. As said above, Kiparsky assumes that for Vedic "like us, [Påˆini] had to rely on what he found in the texts" (p. 8). Is this assumption supported by the evidence produced by Kiparsky?
Kiparsky broaches the topic in connection with P. 2.3.25 vibhå∑å guˆe 'striyåm (p. 95). 9 The meaning of this rule Kiparsky describes as follows: "A cause (hetu) which is a property (guˆa), i.e. expressed by an abstract noun, can marginally have the ablative endings, except in the feminine, e.g. v¥ryåt (or preferably v¥ryeˆa) mukta˙ 'released by heroism'." Regarding actual usage, Kiparsky tells us (p. 96): "In the older language, the ablative of cause never appears in abstract nouns." " [It] does not occur before the B®hadåraˆyaka-Upani∑ad. In the Ópastamba-ÍrautasËtra it is frequent only in book 24, which is a later addition ..." "In later Sanskrit, the ablative of cause is ... extremely common." Kiparsky concludes: "The present rule reflects a period after cause in abstract nouns began to be expressible by means of the ablative, but before this became favoured over the instrumental. Judging by the evidence of this rule, then, Påˆini must be dated within a period delimited by the older Upani∑ads (in particular, the B®hadåraˆyakopani∑ad) and the older ÍrautasËtras (in particular, the main body of the Ópastamba-ÍrautasËtra)." [279] Is this conclusion compelling? Clearly not! Time and again Kiparsky's own book shows that less favoured forms or expressions are often not attested in the literature. This means that the evidence of the present rule indicates as date for Påˆini "a period delimited by the older Upani∑ads ... and the ÍrautasËtras" (whatever that may precisely mean) or earlier.
A number of facts seem to favour the second alternative, according to which Påˆini's date is earlier rather than later than the oldest Upani∑ads. I collect the following ones from Kiparsky's book: (i) On p. 87 Kiparsky observes that Påˆini considers ubhaya preferably not (vibhå∑å) a pronoun before nom. pl. Jas, and therefore preferably a noun. However, " [u] bhaya (almost always plural) is ... only declined as a pronoun in the Classical language". Kiparsky is puzzled and speculates: "It is possible that Påˆini forgot about the nominative plural here. However, I rather think that he intended nom. pl. ubhayå˙ to be derivable in his grammar. The form occurs in the Ùgveda (seven times, of which six have the augmen[t] asUK, viz. ubhayåsa˙), along with ubhaye (6x). Thus, it may have still been current in Påˆini's time, although it is hard to believe that it was still the favoured form." Can this not be taken as an indication that Påˆini is not as far removed in time from the earlier strata of Vedic literature as has often been supposed? (ii) P. 3.3.62 prescribes preferably (vå) aP after has 'laugh' to express state or action (bhåve): hasa. The alternative form is håsa, formed with GHaÑ. The form hasa occurs in Vedic only, håsa is the commoner form in Classical Sanskrit. Kiparsky (p. 110) looks upon this case as a counter-instance to his hypothesis. We need not, if we date Påˆini earlier.
(iii) P. 6.3.88 (vibhå∑odare) prescribes marginally (vibhå∑å) substitution of sa for samåna when compounded with udara, and followed by the suffix ya. Kiparsky observes (p. 134): "In fact, sodarya 'co-uterine' is by far the more common form beginning with the SËtra literature. I could find samånodarya only in Ait. Br. 3.3.7. Påˆini's preference here does not agree with Classical Sanskrit usage." True! But it does agree with the assumption that Påˆini lived at a time not far removed from the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa. (iv) P. 6.4.43 (ye vibhå∑å) prescribes marginally, among other things, a passive khåyate of the root khan, besides khanyate. Says Kiparsky (p. 136-37): "The form khanyate is overwhelmingly favoured in Classical Sanskrit. The option khåyate is, in practice, restricted to Vedic (TS: 6.2.11.1, ÍB. 3.5.4.1), though we must assume on the strength of Påˆini's rule that it had not quite died out in his time." Perhaps the reason is that Påˆini's time was not all that far removed from those Vedic scriptures.
Against these four cases there are some which seem to point in the opposite direction:
[280] (i) P. 5.4.130 allows for a marginal Ërdhvajñu 'with raised knees', besides a preferred Ërdhvajånu. Only Ërdhvajñu occurs in the older literature (MS, Ait. Ór.) and it still predominates in SËtra works. Ërdhvajånu, on the other hand, has gained the upper hand in Classical Sanskrit. Remarks Kiparsky (p. 124): "It is noteworthy ... that the usage of the SËtra literature represents in this respect an older standard than Påˆini." (It is worth observing that this rule, which is embarrassing also to Kiparsky, is not commented upon, or used, in the Mahåbhå∑ya (Lahiri, 1935: 68) , and can be removed from its context without any difficulty. It may therefore be one of the additions which are known to have been made to the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ after Patañjali (Bronkhorst, 1983 , esp. § § 2.4 -2.5, 6.2).) (ii) In P. 5.4.144 (Kiparsky, p. 124) Påˆini expresses preference for ßyåvadanta over ßyåvadat. "ßyåvadanta ... is common in Classical Sanskrit, ... [ß]yåvadat seems to be mainly restricted to Vedic. Classical Sanskrit agrees with Påˆini's preference."
Kiparsky has repeatedly (pp. 88, 143, 146, 149) occasion to observe that "Påˆini stands at the threshold of the Classical period" (p. 149). This conflicts in no way with the view that in his time Bråhmaˆa or other Vedic works were still being composed. For according to the view at present investigated, Vedic and the earliest Classical Sanskrit (if I may call it thus) existed for a while side by side. And I cannot but feel that the evidence of which I am aware nowhere contradicts, and to some extent even supports, this view. (6) It is understandable that Kiparsky, and so many others with him, find it hard to think of the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ as contemporaneous with the Bråhmaˆas, those storehouses of magical thought. Påˆini, they like to believe, had outgrown those archaic modes of thought, and attained to something very close to our modern scientific way of thinking. Kiparsky nowhere says this explicitly, but that this is his view is clear from his characterization of the Nirukta as an "archaic work ... which [is] definitely pre-Påˆinian in content and approach, though [it] may not antedate Påˆini in real time as well" (p. 213). The Nirukta, as is wellknown, contains a collection of 'fanciful etymologies', in which also the Bråhmaˆas abound.
I think that this way of looking at the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ is mistaken and anachronistic. I have elsewhere (Bronkhorst, 1981a) tried to show that "the Nirukta and the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ can be looked upon as rational elaborations of the same set (or closely similar sets) of presuppositions" (p. 12). These presuppositions, it should be noted, can only be understood in the light of what we know about magical thought. There is therefore not even here any reason to reject the possibility that both the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ and literature of the Bråhmaˆa type originated in the same time, and among the same people. And it may be a healthy rectification of our notions of 'primitive' thought, to know that "one of the greatest monuments of human [281] intelligence" (as the A∑ †ådhyåy¥ has been called) is based on, and is in a way the product of, magical thinking.
